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In Montenegro, the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), the legal successor to the 
Montenegrin branch of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, has uninterruptedly remained 
in power since the break-up of Yugoslavia. By looking at citizenship policies in Montenegro 
since the disintegration of Yugoslavia as an ‘image of the nation’ and an ‘image of politics’, this 
paper maintains that citizenship legislation has been one of the key mechanisms that has enabled 
the perpetuation of DPS rule. By embedding the ‘image of the nation’ in citizenship legislation, 
the ruling Montenegrin elite reinforced their political agenda. By entrenching the ‘image of 
politics’ in citizenship laws, they managed to produce conditions favouring their electoral 
victories, thus enabling the party’s institutional dominance. 
 




 Citizenship is an ‘internal reflection of state membership’ (O’Leary 1996, 10). Thus, 
citizenship laws speak about the way the political community is construed, and regulate the 
link between individuals and the state. The proliferation of new states after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain gave a new spin to the study of citizenship. In the context of post-communist states, 
with scarcely any history of statehood prior to their independence, citizenship laws embodied 
the ‘image of the nation’ (Shevel 2009, 277). Contra Brubaker (1992), Shevel (2006) argued 
that citizenship laws adopted in the new states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) not only 
reflected the politics of identity, but also the politics of interest. Given the complete lack of 
institutional and legal mechanisms that regulate citizenship, the adoption of the underlying 
legislation emerged from a bargaining among political actors, who had no a priori experience 
of the effect of citizenship laws on other policy areas (Shevel 2009). Hence citizenship laws 
also reflect an ‘image of politics’ at the time of their adoption.  
 Unlike the CEE states, when it became independent in 2006, Montenegro did have 
some institutional experience of regulating its citizenship, stemming from the two tiered 
citizenship regime (federal and republican) of the former Yugoslavia (Štiks 2006). Therefore, 
its citizenship legislation equally represents an ‘image of the nation’ and an ‘image of 
politics’ as has been the case in other post-communist countries with no previous experience 
with citizenship. The encapsulation of the ‘image of the nation’ in citizenship legislation is a 
common trait of many a citizenship laws (Brubaker 1992; Brubaker 1996). Yet, the unique 
trait of the Montenegrin citizenship legislation is the ‘practical’ rather than the ‘ideal’ 
(Brubaker 1992) ‘image of politics’. This practicality, which stands in contrast to Brubaker’s 
(1992) observations on citizenship in post-communist states, mirrors the prior experience of 
the actors involved in bargaining and adopting citizenship laws. By being aware of the effects 
of citizenship legislation on other policy areas, the policymakers were able to deliberately 
change citizenship laws to support their practical political goals.  
Drawing on qualitative research, and in particular on primary sources such as laws 
and party documents, this paper helps to understand how  the ruling Democratic Party of 
Socialists (DPS), the legal successor to the Montenegrin branch of the League of Communists 
of Yugoslavia, has uninterruptedly remained in power in Montenegro since the break-up of 
Yugoslavia. Viewing citizenship policies in Montenegro since the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia as an ‘image of the nation’ and an ‘image of politics’, this research maintains that 
citizenship policies were an important mechanism that has enabled the perpetuation of DPS 
rule. By embedding the ‘image of the nation’ in citizenship legislation, the ruling 
Montenegrin elite reinforced their political agenda. By entrenching the ‘image of politics’ in 
citizenship laws, they managed to produce conditions favouring their electoral victories and 
thus enabling the party’s institutional dominance. 
The ‘image of the nation’ in Montenegro has substantially changed in the two decades 
after the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Morisson 2009). When the ruling elite were closely 
related to Slobodan Milošević in the early 1990s, the ‘image of the nation’ in Montenegro 
was linked to the one in Serbia. With the split in the DPS in 1997, the faction of the party that 
remained in power gradually distanced itself from the institutions of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) (ICG 2005). After the fall of Milošević, the ruling DPS embraced the idea 
of the independent statehood and supported it with the rhetoric on a separate Montenegrin 
‘image of the nation’. This change has also been embedded in different ways of regulating 
citizenship, examined in detail in the next section of the paper. Hence, citizenship policies 
were crucial in establishing the political identity of the DPS. They served both as means of 
detaching from the Belgrade regime in the late 1990s, and as a tool for associating the idea of 
nationhood to the party’s political program in the newly independent state. 
Yet, citizenship laws in Montenegro after the disintegration of Yugoslavia also 
reflected an ‘image of politics’, in that they supported practical political goals of the ruling 
elite. Citizenship policies have underpinned the electoral arithmetic, particular at the time of 
the divide over statehood and identity in Montenegro. The direct link between citizenship 
policies and election laws proved to be an important mechanism for preserving the electoral 
balances. In turn, the continuous DPS rule that was enabled through elections helped the 
party to establish institutional dominance over the state’s political and economic resources. 
 
2. Citizenship and the ‘image of the nation’ 
 
By looking at how the ‘image of the nation’ was represented through different citizenship 
acts applied in Montenegro, this section argues that citizenship policies were inextricably 
related to the evolution of the political identity of the DPS, and  as such have helped the party 
to affirm its dominance in Montenegro’s political context. This was possible because the 
‘image of the nation’ in Montenegro was closely related to the identity of political actors.  
2.1. Citizenship and the ‘image of the nation’ in the early 1990s 
 
The change in the structure of the communist leadership in Montenegro at the time of the 
‘anti-bureaucratic revolutions’ of 1988 and 1989 paved way to Milošević’s growing control 
over Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro. The newly emerged leaders in the League of 
Communists of Montenegro (DPS since 1990) drew their political strength from their 
association with Milošević, whose rhetoric was particularly appealing in Montenegro due to 
the overlapping of the different aspects of ‘Serb’ and ‘Montenegrin’ identity (see Morrison 
2009; Roberts 2007). The fact that the elite in the first half of the 1990s did not emphasise the 
difference between the two counterparts of Montenegrin identity helped to preserve the 
populist movement driven by Serbian nationalism. As a consequence of the association of the 
DPS with Serbian nationalism, citizenship policies in Montenegro were regulated in line with 
the federal policy.  
Hence, no separate citizenship laws were adopted in the first half of the 1990s, either 
in Montenegro or in the FRY. The Yugoslav Citizenship Act was adopted only in 1996, since 
the policymakers in the FRY sought to circumvent clear legal definitions of citizenship. This 
avoidance allowed them a greater margin of manoeuvre when it comes to ethnicity and 
citizenship, which were particularly malleable at the time of ethnic conflicts. According to 
Štiks (2006), the manipulation of a huge number of refugees through citizenship policies in 
the 1990s supported Milošević’s policies of changing the ethnic balance in Kosovo, 
Vojvodina and Montenegro. The fact that these policies were also applied in Montenegro and 
the inexistence of separate citizenship legislation indicate that the ‘image of the nation’ 
followed the lines of Serb nationalism. This fed into the political agenda of the ruling DPS 
until 1997, and reinforced its political rhetoric.  
 
2.2. The changing ‘image of the nation’ amidst different political agendas  
 
 The split of the DPS in 1997 triggered the competition for power between the two 
strands of the DPS and required the ruling elite to ‘reinvent’ themselves amidst the new 
political context. The wing of the DPS led by Milo Đukanović initially constructed its 
identity in opposition to the regime in Belgrade. Đukanović did not immediately embrace the 
independence project, largely due to the duality of identity in Montenegro (see Morisson 
2009). Rather, in the years preceding the fall of Milošević, this political camp focused on 
distancing Montenegro from the federal institutions. By contrast, the competing wing (SNP 
as of 1998) – led by Momir Bulatović – acquired the role of the supporter of Milošević’s 
politics. Simultaneously, it emphasised the corrupt nature of Đukanović’s DPS, and claimed 
that the Montenegrin ruling elite sought to retain their grip over the state. The diversification 
of these two political camps in Montenegro implied the reconstruction of the political scene 
from a political monolith (Morisson 2009) to a bifurcated political community. Thus in order 
to remain in power in Montenegro, the DPS had to change its political profile. Citizenship 
policies had an important role in this process. Not only did they help to detach Montenegro 
from the FRY, but also they helped to re-create the political identity of the DPS.    
 From 1997 onwards, Đukanović’s DPS embarked upon a process of ‘creeping 
independence’, i.e. the gradual establishment of institutions in Montenegro that would 
function independently from the ones of the FRY (Morrison 2009; Roberts 2007). Citizenship 
policy was an integral part of ‘creeping independence’ because the 1999 Law on 
Montenegrin Citizenship stood in conflict with the Yugoslav Citizenship Act of 1996. It 
provided for the acquisition of the republican citizenship without the prior or simultaneous 
acquisition of the federal one. According to European Stability Initiative, the 1999 Law on 
Montenegrin Citizenship ‘reads as if Montenegro were an independent state, and refrains 
from defining Montenegrin citizenship as subsidiary to Yugoslav citizenship’ (2001: 2). 
However, at that time, Montenegro’s independence was not on the government’s agenda; 
rather, it was the decentralisation of the FRY. Yet, the aggregate of the decentralising policies 
eventually provided a push towards independence for the Montenegrin political elite after the 
fall of Milošević in 2000. 
Given that the post 1997 Montenegrin citizenship policy marked the detachment from 
Belgrade, while defining membership in the Montenegrin polity, it became pivotal for 
shaping the agenda of Đukanović’s DPS. As such, it contributed both to the development of 
the DPS’s political identity, and – by association – to the identity of its followers. By the end 
of the last millennium, Đukanović’s DPS was associated with independence and a separate 
Montenegrin national identity. The competing SNP corresponded to the union with Serbia, 
and the emphasis on the Serbian origins of Montenegrins. The supporters of the ruling DPS-
led coalition, and subsequently the independence idea, largely identified themselves as 
‘Montenegrins’.1 By contrast, the then SNP-led opposition, which supported the common 
state with Serbia, predominantly identified themselves as ‘Serbs’. Hence, the 1999 Law on 
Montenegrin Citizenship indirectly contained an ‘image of the nation’, in that it helped to 
establish the political identity of the DPS, which gradually turned to independence and built 
its political agenda by emphasising a distinct Montenegrin national identity after the ouster of 
Milošević.  
 
2.3. The new ‘image of the nation’ 
 
The ‘image of the nation’ reflected in the provisions of the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act 
supports the ruling DPS through two mutually reinforcing elements. First, the conflictual 
politics of ethnic/national identity in Montenegro yielded a civic citizenship policy, which in 
line with Shevel’s (2005) observations is civic by default and not by design. This means that 
such a civic dimension of citizenship is merely non-ethnic, and at the service of the nation-
building project. Second, Montenegrin citizenship legislation is restrictive in terms of dual 
citizenship because ‘[d]ual citizenship blurs boundaries between nations, which could pave 
the way for the unification of these nations into a single state’ (Shevel 2009, 282).  
 According to the 2007 Constitution, citizenship in Montenegro denotes the 
relationship between individuals and the state, rather than national or ethnic belonging. This 
is an important aspect of the concept of citizenship in Montenegro, where no ethnic or 
national group forms the majority.2 The 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act clearly states that 
the term ‘citizenship’ does not imply ‘national and ethnical origin’ (art.1), along the lines of 
the 2007 Constitution. Indeed, these two legal acts largely reflect the political dynamic after 
Montenegro became an independent state. The post-referendum environment in Montenegro, 
within which the 2008 Citizenship Act has been adopted, was characterised by the persistence 
of the division over Montenegrin nationhood. The aim of the DPS-led government, which 
based its policies on the rhetoric of European integration and multiculturalism, was to retain 
the votes of minorities gained in the pre-referendum period (see Bieber 2003a) with the 
concept of the ‘civic’ state. That is, by embedding the ‘image of the nation’ defined in 
political terms in the 2008 Citizenship Act the ruling DPS avoided the conundrum over the 
separateness of Montenegrin identity from the Serbian one, while also circumventing the 
ethnic ‘image of the nation’ which would not be appealing to the minorities.  
 Moreover, the restrictive dual citizenship policy has played an important role for 
affirming the identity of the DPS as the champions of independent statehood. The division 
over statehood and identity in Montenegro, coupled by the overall political context in the 
Balkans made the debate on the issue of dual citizenship in Montenegro politically sensitive. 
This is so because dual or multiple citizenship raises concerns over whether the acquisition of 
citizenship of the second state may dilute an individual’s relationship with their state of origin 
(Boll 2007). That is, the issue that arises as a result of dual citizenship is whether an 
individual can qualify as loyal to multiple states at the same time. In the context of 
Montenegro’s relationship with Serbia in particular, dual citizenship is not only related to 
participation as argued by Džankić (2010), but also raises issues of loyalty to the newly 
established Montenegrin state, which has been the ‘agenda’ of the DPS’s pro-independence 
camp since 2000. A recent case of withdrawal of Montenegrin citizenship to Predrag 
Popović, the leader of the opposition People’s Party (NS) which emphasised the Serb origins 
of Montenegrins, on grounds that he had voluntarily acquired Serbian citizenship is 
illustrative of the contentiousness of dual citizenship in Montenegro (B92, web).  
 
2.4. Citizenship between European norms and a contested ‘image of the nation’? 
 
The experience of CEE states has shown that international norms, and particular the 
European ones, shape the citizenship regimes of emerging democracies (Shevel 2009; Shaw 
and Štiks 2010). Although the norms of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the EU have 
indisputably had an effect on Montenegro’s citizenship policy (see Džankić 2010), their 
impact has been limited because the policymakers sought to preserve the ‘image of the 
nation’ already enshrined in the 2008 Citizenship Act. The minor changes to the citizenship 
law reinforced the DPS’s rhetoric on European integration both domestically and 
internationally. However, the partial effect of international and European citizenship norms 
sustained Montenegro’s restrictive citizenship policy. 
 On 22 June 2010, Montenegro ratified the European Convention on Nationality 
(ECN), which induced some changes to the country’s citizenship act. The 2010 amendments 
to arts. 8 and 11 of Montenegro’s 2008 Citizenship act clearly reflect the influence of the 
ECN on the domestic legislation. The change to art. 8 (military duty and release from 
citizenship of the state of origin) is evidently related to arts. 21 and 22 of ECN regulating 
military service in cases of dual nationality. As military duty has been abolished in 
Montenegro, an applicant who fails to obtain release from citizenship of their state of origin 
as they did not complete the military service in their respective state, will be able to 
voluntarily denounce that citizenship before Montenegrin authorities prior to their 
naturalisation. At the same time, the clarification of art. 11 related to the acquisition of the 
Montenegrin citizenship in cases of spouses of Montenegrin citizens has been influenced by 
art. 6 of ECN. While on the one hand, these limited changes reinforce the DPS’s political 
program of ‘[l]aws grounded on European legal standards’ (DPS Program 2011, web), it is 
worth noting that, in the post-Yugoslav context, Montenegro has been the only country that 
has placed a reservation on art. 16 of the ECN, dealing with dual citizenship. This reservation 
enables Montenegro to retain its restrictive dual citizenship policy, which is a contentious 
issue especially in relation to Serbia. Hence, while the ECN has instigated some cosmetic 
changes to Montenegro’s citizenship legislation, any substantial change has been hampered 
by the ‘image of the nation’ enshrined in the 2008 Citizenship Act.  
 In a similar way, the most recent changes to the country’s citizenship policy came as a 
result of a political compromise between the major political players required to adopt the new 
Election Law. In its 2010 Opinion, the European Commission (EC) conditioned the start of 
the accession negotiations by stipulating seven requirements, including the enhancement of 
the ‘legislative framework for elections in line with the recommendations of the OSCE-
ODIHR and the Venice Commission’ (2010: 11). In the context of Montenegro’s internal 
debate over statehood and identity, one of the major obstacles to the adoption of new election 
legislation was the citizenship status of the people from other former Yugoslav republics 
residing in Montenegro (see Džankić 2010). Since the adoption of electoral legislation in 
Montenegro required a 2/3 majority support, the Montenegrin opposition conditioned any 
agreement on the election legislation by facilitated naturalisation for this category of people. 
The conferral of citizenship and thus voting rights upon over 25,000 of these people 
(UNHCR 2011), would threaten the electoral balance in Montenegro. Hence, it could 
potentially be threatening to the ruling DPS coalition, which was reluctant to make a major 
compromise on the issue for years (see Janković 2011).  Notwithstanding, the approaching 
date of publication of the Progress Report of the EC, and the need to reaffirm the 
commitment to European integration, forced the political actors to reach an agreement upon 
the Election Law in September 2011. The compromise thus reached between the government 
and the opposition yielded a change in Montenegro’s citizenship legislation, resulting in a 
slightly facilitated naturalisation for citizens of the former Yugoslav republics.  
According to the transitory provision of the Montenegrin Citizenship Act (art. 41v), in 
force until 31 January 2012,  
‘citizens of one of the republics of the former Yugoslavia who registered residence in 
Montenegro at least 5 years prior to the date of Montenegro’s declaration of independence (3 
June 2006) can be granted Montenegrin citizenship, provided they did not unregister their 
residency in Montenegro before submitting the application, and that they fulfil financial 
conditions and have security clearance as stipulated in article 8, para 1, points 4, 5, 7, and 8 of 
the Montenegrin Citizenship Act’.  
The underlying provisions were mostly applied to the people from Bosnia and Croatia 
who sought refuge in Montenegro in the early 1990s (who were predominantly of Serb ethnic 
background), registered lawful residence, but failed to naturalise previously as they could not 
obtain release from their citizenship of origin, either due to poorly kept registers, the 
consequences of the wars of Yugoslav disintegration, or who wanted to keep their primary 
citizenship.3 The number of these people in June 2010 was 2,809 (SNP 2010). Yet, a several 
times larger number of people seeking Montenegrin citizenship will remain unaffected by the 
new provisions.4 For them, the problematic aspect of the new provision is that the law still 
requires the applicants to have registered ‘residence’ in Montenegro. Most of the people 
(Roma and the Serbs from Kosovo) who fled the Kosovo war have registered with the Bureau 
for the Care of Refugees, which is an institution that does not grant residence status (see 
EUDO case law on Montenegro). Hence the amendment, although ostensibly liberalising, 
allowed a limited number of people to be naturalised (Džankić 2011, web), while proving the 
ruling elite’s commitment to ‘actively contributing to European integration’ (DPS Program, 
web). 
The limited impact of the European norms on Montenegro’s citizenship regime due to 
the conflictual nature of nationhood in the country has further been confirmed by the recent 
debate over whether to extend the naturalisation deadline of the transitory provision 41v. 
While the extension was proposed and supported by Montenegro’s opposition parties, the 
ruling DPS maintained that it was a way ‘to sneak in dual citizenship’ (Pobjeda, 27 January 
2011). The persistence on the ‘image of the nation’ that already exists in Montenegro’s 
current citizenship legislation reflects clear policy preferences of the ruling DPS. In that 
respect, it prevents the expansion of Montenegro’s citizenship to those people who are likely 
to have split loyalties between Montenegro and Serbia.  
 
3. Citizenship and the ‘image of politics’ 
 
The studies of citizenship have revealed the multiple links between the membership in a state 
and the way power relations are organised therein. As a result of the DPS’s dominance in the 
process of adopting citizenship legislation, the ‘image of politics’ vested in Montenegro’s 
citizenship laws also displays an image of interest. As opposed to the countries in CEE 
(Shevel 2009), Montenegro has had a previous experience of managing its citizenship policy 
under communism, which made the legislators aware of its effect on other policy areas. In the 
former Yugoslavia, the republican citizenship was closely related to voting rights, as only 
republic-level registers of citizens existed until 1991. This fact enabled the DPS to use 
citizenship policies to manage the electoral processes, which according to Birch ‘represent 
both a conduit through which power is channelled and a medium through which power is 
displayed’ (2011: 703). In turn, electoral victories facilitated the DPS’s access to the 
country’s institutional structures, which, similar to the case of contemporary Russia, resulted 
in the abuse of ‘administrative resources’ for further victories at elections (Birch 2011; Ross 
2011). 
   
3.1. The practical side of citizenship: electoral dynamics 
 
Citizens exercise the major political aspect of citizenship by ‘the right to participate in the 
exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an 
elector of the members of such a body’(Marshall and Bottomore 1997: 8). Franchise is 
particularly relevant in the case of Montenegro, which is a small country of an electorate of 
less than half a million. Hence, it is argued here that citizenship has been used for regulating 
the electoral politics, because in a small country a minor change in the number of voters 
represents a greater faction of the electorate, and can thus change electoral balances. This was 
accomplished through the ‘electoral misconduct’, or the ‘deviations that reflect intentional 
efforts to manipulate elections for personal or partisan ends’ (Birch 2011: 703). On grounds 
of their examination of electoral politics in different post-Soviet states, Birch (2011) and Ross 
(2011) have found that the manipulation of the electoral register has been one of the most 
commonly used techniques or ensuring electoral victories. Although the international 
observers have concluded that, since 1998, Montenegro’s electoral register contained a 
margin of errors falling ‘within the parameters of established democracies with similar 
registration systems’ (OSCE 2000), the manipulation of the electoral register through 
citizenship polices is a less manifest form of ‘electoral misconduct’. That is, the manipulation 
does not occur in the register itself. Rather, as voting rights are inseparable from citizenship, 
the regulation of the latter (managed by the Ministry of Interior), set the parameters for 
inclusion or exclusion of individuals in the former (Managed by a number of municipal 
bodies coordinated by the Republic Election Commission (REC).  
 According to the 1990 Law on the Election and Recall of Representatives and 
Deputies, voting rights in Montenegro were granted to ‘citizens of 18 years of age, who have 
residence on the territory of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro at least 3 months prior to 
the date of elections’ (art. 4). In the context of Džankić’s (2011) differentiation of the 
categories of citizens, the Law remained unclear as to whether the notion of ‘citizens’ 
(građani) referred only to the people who had the republican citizenship of Montenegro, or to 
those citizens of the socialist Yugoslavia who resided in Montenegro three months prior to 
the elections.5 The uncertainty over voting rights left the political elite enough room for 
manoeuvre in deciding on franchise and helped the League of Communists to win the 
elections. Hence, coupled with the seat distribution formula, citizenship policies allowed the 
former communists to obtain 83 out of 125 parliamentary seats by winning 56 per cent of the 
popular vote in the 1990 electoral race (CDT 2011). 
 The ‘electoral misconduct’ related to the link between citizenship and voting rights 
also manifested itself in the 1992 parliamentary elections in Montenegro, the first ones after 
the establishment of the FRY.  The FRY Constitution instituted Yugoslav citizenship, 
and republican citizenship as its second tier (art. 17). Almost simultaneously, the Constitution 
of the Republic of Montenegro, enacted on 12 October 1992 established the category of 
Montenegrin citizenship, but no separate law was adopted (see Džankić 2010). As a 
consequence, at the time of the extraordinary parliamentary elections in 1992, citizenship of 
Yugoslavia, and not of Montenegro, coupled with residence was the determinant of voting 
rights.  
 In fact, the 1992 Election Law stipulated that voting rights were conferred to 
‘Yugoslav citizens of 18 years of age, who have legal capabilities, and who have residence on 
the territory of the republic of Montenegro for at least 6 months prior to the date of elections’ 
(art. 11). This provision was supplemented by a legal definition of the term ‘Yugoslav 
citizen’, which referred to FRY citizens (art. 127). In addition, voting rights were granted to 
other citizens of the republics of the former Yugoslavia who resided in Montenegro for a year 
prior to the elections, which helped to increase the republic’s electorate from 402,861 in 1990 
to 429,045 in 1992 (CDT 2011). The substantial increase in the electorate was also due to the 
influx of people fleeing the wars of Yugoslav disintegration, who had registered their 
residence in Montenegro in 1990 and 1991. These people were (predominantly) of Serbian 
ethnic belonging. Hence, the addendum to the electorate helped to reinforce the political 
dominance of the ruling DPS that was close to Milošević at the time (see CDT 2011).  
 The intensification of the link between citizenship and electoral politics became 
apparent after the internal split in the DPS, and in that the content of the citizenship 
legislation shows the practical image of politics. According to Shevel (2005:9), ‘[p]ractical 
consequences of the first citizenship legislation will become apparent and will become an 
additional source of citizenship policy’. As a consequence of the previous knowledge of the 
ruling elite of the effects of citizenship on voting rights, the provisions of the 1999 Law on 
Montenegrin Citizenship were restrictive. The stringent provisions for naturalisation posed a 
barrier to citizenship (Džankić 2010), and thus to political participation, to a large number of 
displaced persons from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The people who sought refuge 
in Montenegro at the time of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were predominantly of Serb 
ethnicity. Thus, they were more likely to vote for the political faction that supported 
Milošević and – after his ouster – the common state with Serbia.  
 An additional consequence of the internal Montenegrin debate reflected in the link 
between citizenship and voting rights was that the 2000 Election Law also became more 
stringent in that voting rights were granted to ‘citizens of Montenegro of 18 years of age, who 
have legal capacity, and residence on the territory of Montenegro for at least 24 months prior 
to the date of elections’ (art. 11). This provision marked a clear departure from the previous 
legal order in which conferred voting rights to ‘Yugoslav’ citizens who resided in 
Montenegro for 6 months prior to the elections. As a consequence of this dynamic, the 
number of voters decreased from 457,633 in 1998 to 447,673 in 2001 (CDT 2011).  Although 
a part of the change is due to the regular maintenance of the electoral register, the reduction 
in the number of ‘Yugoslav’ voters, which would have been more inclined to vote the 
opposition parties, helped the DPS to win in the subsequent election rounds. Along with its 
pro-independence coalition partners, Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Liberal Alliance 
of Montenegro (LSCG), the DPS won the elections in 2001, as well as the 2002 elections, 
after the fallout with the LSCG over the DPS’s decision to sign the 2002 Belgrade Agreement 
and put the referendum on independence on hold for three years.   
 The relation between citizenship and voting rights was also pronounced after the 
transformation of the FRY into Serbia and Montenegro in 2002. The legislation of the 
‘transformed’ state stipulated a clear link between the voting rights and citizenship. 
According to the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro, citizens of the constituent 
states had equal rights and duties in the other state, apart from electoral rights (art. 7). This 
fact was extremely significant at the time of the 2006 referendum on independence in 
Montenegro, and in the pre-referendum debate.6 The importance of the number of people 
who could take part in the political processes in Montenegro is best seen in the referendum 
results. Effectively, the number of voters that supported Montenegro’s independence 
exceeded the required threshold of 55 per cent set by the European Union by 2,095 votes, or 
0.5 per cent (CDT 2006). Thus, the fact that Montenegro continued to regulate its citizenship 
policies in the common state with Serbia was pivotal for maintaining the arithmetic of voting, 
which favoured the ruling DPS and its coalition partners at the time of the referendum on 
independence. The victory at the referendum, in turn, helped the DPS to foster its rhetoric on 
being the champions of the Montenegrin statehood and nationhood, and also to cement its 
institutional dominance in the new state. 
 After Montenegro became independent, the Constitution of Montenegro enacted on 19 
October 2007 established a separate Montenegrin citizenship (art. 12), regulated by the 2008 
Montenegrin Citizenship Act. In addition to the definition of citizenship, the 2007 
Constitution of Montenegro also stipulated the conditions for the conferral of voting rights. 
Pursuant to art. 45 of the Constitution, voting became exclusive to the people who possessed 
the citizenship status in Montenegro.7 Such a legal provision excluded 25,000 people who 
had the republican citizenship of Serbia and who after the breakup with Serbia were not able 
or willing to obtain the Montenegrin citizenship, particular as it would entail losing their 
citizenship of origin (Džankić 2010a; Džankić 2012, forthcoming). Given that the majority of 
these people would affiliate with the opposition parties, the link between citizenship and 
franchise helped the ruling elite to win the 2009 parliamentary elections. 
The link between voting rights and citizenship came into play once again at the time 
of the adoption of the 2011 amendments to the Montenegrin Election Law (see Džankić 
2011, web).  Although voting rights remained related to the status of citizenship, the 
amendments sought to avoid the association of rights with the different categories of 
‘citizens’ as outlined by Džankić (2010; 2012). As a consequence, the word ‘citizen’ 
(građanin) was substituted by the word ‘elector’ (birač) throughout the text of the Law. Yet, 
as explained in the previous section, the most recent change in the citizenship policy of 
Montenegro is likely to preserve the electoral balance in that it will have a limited effect on 
the number of electors and thus on electoral outcomes in the coming years (see Džankić 
2011, web).  
 
3.2. The ‘spill-overs’ of citizenship: state administration and the politics of interest 
 
The link between citizenship and institutions of the state is not as direct and 
pronounced as the one between citizenship and elections. However, drawing on the electoral 
victories, which were directly influenced by the various citizenship policies, the ruling 
Montenegrin elite was able to cement itself within the institutions of the state. This, in turn, 
resulted in the indistinctiveness between the party and the state, which subsequently assisted 
the ruling elite in securing electoral victories ever since the first multiparty elections in 1990.  
Such effects of the ‘spill-over’ of citizenship policies mirror the politics of interest, which 
due to the previous experience of the ruling DPS with managing citizenship were ‘pragmatic’ 
and not ‘ideal’. The exhibited pragmatism thus helped the DPS to remain in power in 
Montenegro through two interrelated arenas. First, the composition and size of the public and 
state administration, proved to be an important pool of votes for the DPS as well as a 
mechanism for ensuring the party dominance over institutions. Second, the dominance over 
institutions allowed the ruling Montenegrin elite to develop a form of corruption, which 
Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) defined as ‘state capture’. In this context, state capture 
refers to the informal and preferential structures that affect the making and implementation of 
laws (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000). Such a capture of the state affected the 
development of electoral dynamics from 1990 to today and helped to cement the DPS power 
in Montenegro. 
State administration in Montenegro is composed of line ministries headed by 
ministers, and other administration bodies which employ civil servants and state employees. 
The employment in state administration in Montenegro is conditional on the citizenship 
status, and this criterion has also undergone a change, in line with the shifts in the political 
environment. The 1991 Law on Civil Servants (art. 4) stipulated that the employment in state 
administration in Montenegro is conditional on the citizenship of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Given the fact that the 1991 law remained in force until 2004, and 
that the socialist Yugoslavia was replaced with the FRY in 1992, the law remained 
ambiguous and thus provided the ruling elite with a large margin of discretion in employing 
civil servants and state employees. While it is empirically impossible to determine the direct 
link between employment in state administration and party membership, multiple sources 
(Rastoder 2010; Đuranović 1996, web) maintain that throughout the 1990s, the DPS ‘purged’ 
the state administration from the ‘unsuitable and the unfaithful’ (Rastoder 2010: 9).  
Writing shortly after the 1996 parliamentary elections Đuranović (1996, web), 
reported that the then vice-president of the DPS and the then Prime Minister Milo Đukanović 
stated that  
[w]e have to clean our house. We need to “thank” those people who have worked under the 
umbrella of the DPS and its government until now, opposing this government, and who have 
now finally shown their real face, by serving the opposition whose politics are based on 
accusations against the DPS and this government. 
According to the same source, this statement of Đukanović was an announcement of the 
‘complete merger of the party and the state, that is, the creation of the party dominated state’ 
(Đuranović 1996, web). Although Đuranović (1996) made his observations shortly before the 
1997 split in the ruling party, these are applicable to the subsequent period as well. This is so 
because in the months immediately following the split, Đukanović co-opted powerful 
individuals to stand for his cause.8 The co-option of these individuals, who later received 
prominent positions in the government, gave Đukanović control over the party and a number 
of state institutions, including the State’s Security Agency (SDB) and the Ministry of the 
Interior’s Secret Service. 
The party dominance over the state administration is also reflected in the statements 
of the DPS that ‘the Government of Montenegro literally provides for the 60 per cent of 
Montenegro’s population’ (Đuranović 1996, web). Even fifteen years after the 
aforementioned claims were made, ‘Montenegro’s relative wage bill for “general 
government” in 2006 was higher than Croatia and Slovenia’, countries which are larger in 
terms of their population (Cohen 2010: 10). According to Cohen, ‘Montenegro stands out in 
terms of the relative size of its state administration as a percentage of the employed 
population, i.e., civil servants and employees working in government agencies’(2010: 10). 
Making up a fifth of the country’s workforce, state administration provided a large pool of 
voters and has been an important element that contributed to the DPS’s electoral victories 
since 1990. As a consequence, the party and the state became intimately related, helping the 
ruling elite to push for further electoral and citizenship policies that enabled them to stay in 
power.  
These dynamics were particularly pronounced in the first years of Montenegro’s post-
communist transition, when the DPS’s rule was reinforced by two factors. These factors, that 
is, ‘spill-overs’ of the intimate link between citizenship elections, are indicators of the 
practical link between the regulation of citizenship and other policy areas. First, the change of 
the overall system of governance occurred in such a setup that it allowed the de facto 
perpetuation of the (‘reformed’) communist party. As the heir of the communist party the 
DPS was able to retain most of its resources. Similar to the experience in other Central and 
East European states (Szeleny and Szeleny 1995), these resources allowed the DPS to seize 
the economic and political infrastructure of Montenegro. According to Jovanović (2012, 
web), the state became the major source of revenue for the DPS, not only through the state 
funds allocated to parties on grounds of the Law on the Financing of Political Parties but also 
through donations, most of which have been made by employees in public administration. In 
addition, the building of the Communist Party became property of the DPS and an important 
source of funds for the party (Jovanović 2012, web). The DPS (party) ‘rented’ the premises in 
that building to the DPS-government, while retaining the party offices inside as well. This 
allowed the party oversight over the government, thus facilitating the penetration of the ruling 
elite’s interests in the network of government’s institutions.  
Second, political instability in Montenegro and the wars of Yugoslav disintegration 
had a twofold effect on the socio-political context in Montenegro. These circumstances 
largely facilitated the flourishing of nationalist sentiments, leading to a part of the 
Montenegrin population participating in the attacks of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) on 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. While marginalising the socio-economic issues, the rise 
of nationalism further reinforced the DPS’s political position. Effectively, the pauperised and 
insecure population of Montenegro looked up to the republic’s leadership as a guarantor of 
stability. Yet, given the alignment of the Montenegrin elite with the regime in Belgrade, and 
its inability to resist the pressure thereof, these guarantees of stability took the shape of a 
Serbian nationalist rhetoric. Moreover, the economic embargo to the FRY and the country’s 
isolationist politics facilitated the establishment of ‘the schemes the elites in the Yugoslav 
republics used to develop and stimulate smuggling operations’ (Hajdinjak 2002, 5). At that 
time, smuggling channels in Montenegro were developed in order to supply commodities 
such as oil and cigarettes. The illicit trade generated revenues of over one million dollars per 
day for oil, and two million dollars per day for cigarettes (Hajdinjak 2002).  Initially, the 
revenues from cigarette and oil smuggling were used as Montenegrin contribution to the 
Serbian operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus fuelling Serbian nationalism. However, 
as the profits increased, their major share was retained by the people involved in smuggling, 
which included the top level politicians in Montenegro (Ivanović 1999). These transitional 
irregularities allowed a small oligarchy of the ruling elites to use the power vacuum at the top 
of society created by the fall of the previous system (Medojević 2001; Uzelac 2007). In turn, 
the capture of the state, both institutionally and economically, helped the ruling DPS to 




Albeit adopted in different contexts, citizenship policies always reflect the way a state has 
come into being and its political context. This is particularly true for the post-Yugoslav states, 
all of which have emerged from the Yugoslav citizenship regime but have manifestly 
different rules that regulate the link between the individual and the state (see Deželan 2011; 
Koska 2011; Sarajlić 2010; Vasiljević 2011; Krasniqi 2010; Spaskovska 2010; Džankić 
2010). In that, citizenship policies mirror both the ‘image of the nation’ and ‘the image of 
politics’ in the new states in the Western Balkans. The argument of this paper is that, through 
those two images, citizenship policies in Montenegro have underwritten the longevity of the 
DPS’s rule. The changing image of the nation enshrined in Montenegro’s citizenship policy 
closely followed the political evolution of the party’s stance towards Montenegro’s 
nationhood and thus helped to reinforce the DPS’s political rhetoric. The practical image of 
politics contributed to the creation of conditions favourable to the DPS’s electoral victories, 
which in turn enabled the party to become embedded in the state’s institutions.  
Having in mind the reflection of the ‘image of the nation’ in citizenship policies, Štiks 
(2006) noted that, in the post-partition context of the former Yugoslavia, citizenship policies 
were used to determine membership. Hence, they became an indispensable tool of ‘ethnic 
engineering’ because they were deliberately used to reaffirm the numerical dominance of the 
majority group in the newly established states. Notwithstanding, citizenship policies in 
Montenegro were a peculiar variant of the post-Yugoslav model, in that citizenship was not a 
mechanism of ethnic homogenisation as the Montenegrin case does not completely fit the 
Balkans paradigm of ethnic citizenship (Džankić 2010). This fact is mostly due to the 
pluriethnic composition of Montenegro, whereby no ethnic group forms the majority of the 
population, which makes ethnic homogenisation virtually impossible. Instead, the 
development of the different aspects of citizenship in Montenegro has been framed through 
the transformation of the agenda of the ruling elite, which fluctuated from the closeness to 
Milošević in the early 1990s, through the opposition to the regime in Belgrade after the 1997 
DPS split, to the management of the divide over Montenegrin statehood and nationhood in 
the last decade.  
As a consequence of the ruling DPS’s support of Milošević’s politics in the early 
1990s, the ‘image of the nation’ mirrored in the then republic’s citizenship policy was 
equivalent to the FRY one. As such, it underpinned the Serb nationalist rhetoric of the ruling 
elite and contributed to their electoral victories at the time of the wars of Yugoslav 
disintegration. After the DPS split, citizenship policies were used as a means for detaching 
from Belgrade, and posed the pillars for the ‘image of the nation’ used by the DPS during the 
debate over statehood and nationhood. As such, it helped the DPS to establish its political 
identity as anti-Milošević and subsequently as pro-independence. Since Montenegro became 
independent the ‘image of the nation’ has been reflected in 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship 
Act, which due to the conflictual nature of national identity has become ‘civic’ by default 
(Shevel 2009). In addition to this, the conflictual nature of Montenegrin national identity is 
also reflected in the restrictive dual citizenship policy, which is seen by the ruling elite as a 
barrier to Serb influence in Montenegro. Hence, the citizenship policy remains crucial for 
maintaining the political identity of the DPS, and thus is an important catalyst for this party’s 
rule since 1990.  
Yet, the Montenegrin exception in terms of citizenship policy is not reflected in the 
‘image of the nation’ and its relation to the ruling elite. Rather, it is contained in the ‘image of 
politics’, which contrary to Brubaker’s (1992) claims is ‘practical’ and not ‘ideal’. This 
particularity of Montenegro’s citizenship policy stems from the country’s experience in 
regulating the republican citizenship in the former Yugoslavia. While the former Soviet 
republics also had republican citizenship regimes, these played a symbolic rather than a 
pragmatic role. By contrast, in the former Yugoslavia numerous rights, including franchise, 
were regulated through republican citizenship. Consequently, when examining the image of 
politics in the citizenship legislation in the post-Soviet context, Shevel (2006) was able to 
examine the ‘practical’ elements in the amended citizenship legislation, and not in the first 
citizenship laws. In this respect, the case of Montenegro served as an important addendum to 
the growing literature on citizenship. 
By looking at the practical ‘image of politics’ in Montenegro’s citizenship policies in 
the context of electoral legislation, the paper proves that citizenship policies have 
underpinned the voting arithmetic. As such, issues of membership regulated by citizenship 
policies were crucial in preserving the electoral balances in favour of the ruling DPS The 
linking of voting rights in Montenegro to Yugoslav citizenship in the early 1990s was in line 
with the closeness of the unified DPS with the regime in Belgrade. The federal citizenship 
policy, however, was not defined until 1996 which left a broad margin of manoeuvre to the 
political elite to manipulate electoral registers (see OSCE 1998). Similarly, after the split of 
the DPS in 1997, and Đukanović’s detachment from the federal institutions, Yugoslav 
citizenship was no longer the prerequisite for franchise. Rather, it was the Montenegrin 
citizenship that was related to voting rights. In order to prevent the influx of voters from 
Serbia that would likely vote for the opposition parties, the Montenegrin citizenship regime 
was restrictive in terms of naturalisation requirements. A similar pattern has been observed in 
the post-independence period, which is also characterised by a close connection between the 
restrictive citizenship regime and electoral legislation, aimed at retaining the existing balance 
of votes among the political players.  
The second aspect of the ‘image of politics’ that was an important catalyst for the 
longevity of the DPS’s power in Montenegro is the relationship between citizenship and the 
institutions of the state, which is presupposed on the intimate link between citizenship and 
electoral victories. The dominance over the state administration not only proved to be an 
important pool of votes for the DPS, but it also facilitated the party’s access to further 
economic and political resources. In turn, these embedded the party in the state, thus 
contributing to the DPS’s political victories from 1990 to this day.  
 
                                                          
1 Not all of the ‘Montenegrins’ believed that ‘Montenegrin’ and ‘Serb’ were mutually exclusive. For more 
details on Montenegrin identity (see Morisson 2009). 
2 According to the 2011 census (Monstat 2011), the ethnic composite in Montenegro is: Montenegrins (45 per 
cent), Serbs (28.7 per cent), Bosniaks (8.6 per cent), Albanians (4.9 per cent), Muslims (3.3 per cent), Croats (1 
per cent), and Roma (0.3 per cent). 
3 However, had they at any given moment unregistered their residence in Montenegro so as to regulate their 
citizenship of origin, they would not be covered by the scope of the amendment to the Citizenship Act. 
4 In 2010, there were 24,019 persons registered as displaced persons and IDPs in Montenegro (UNHCR 2010). 
Although there are no exact numbers, the majority of them came from Kosovo, which is further corroborated by 
the fact that the above numbers include 10, 951IDP Roma (Informacija o preregistraciji 2009). 
5 The latter implies an increase in the number of electors.  
6 At the time of the pre-referendum debate, then President of Serbia – Vojislav Koštunica – requested that over 
264,802 Montenegrins residing in Serbia receive voting rights in Montenegro. Because the voting population of 
Montenegro stood at 457,633 such a major addition of voters would have significantly affected the results of the 
plebiscite (voters from Serbia were likely to vote for the preservation of the common state).  
7 In Montenegro, two terms are used to refer to the notion of the ‘citizen’: 1) general category of ‘citizen’ 
(građanin) and 2)  the category of ‘citizen’ status (državljanin). Voting rights are granted only to the second 
category of ‘citizens’(see: Džankić 2010a; Džankić 2012). 
8 These influential individuals included Svetozar Marović (then Speaker of Parliament), Vukašin Maraš (then 
head of the secret service), .Predrag Goranović (then Minister of Finance); Filip Vujanović (then Minister of 
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